




THE auction-sale-from augeo, to gradually increase-is, as its
name imports, of Latin origin, having been introduced by the
Rmans, to dispose of spoils or captives taken in war. Such sales
took place on the open field, or before the victor's tent; a spear
being erected in the ground to which was attached a red streamer
to attract purchasers; whence perhaps comes our present custom
of the red flag at every auction door. To be sold under the spear,
sub lasta, was therefore to be sold to the highest bidder at or by
public auction.
The usual method of the auction sale is, of course, to commence
with the lowest bidder and gradually advance to the highest,
but in Holland the mode of sale, called Dutch Auctions, is in the
reverse order; the article being offered at the highest price stated,
and a purchaser called for at that sum, the price being gradually
lowered until a purchaser is found. These are called auctions,
although " Sales by Decretion" would more exactly describe them.
Dutch auctions are sometimes resorted to in this country, an
instance of which may be found in Village of Deposit v. Pitts, 18
Hun 475.
Some difference of opinion exists whether such sales should be
called "sales at auction or "sales by auction ;" but whichever be
the more correct, the phrase "auction sales" would apparently
suffice. Let us trace the progress of this sale and see when and
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how various liabilities arise under it, and the nature and conse-
quences thereof.
The owner of goods sends his property to an auction store.
This act alone primna facie gives the auctioneer authority to sell
them by auction. As selling is his business and his only business,
he has a right to infer, in the absence of other instructions, that
the owner sends them to him for this purpose.
And by the English law goods sent to a public auction room for
sale, are, while there, exempt for distress for rent due from the
auctioneer: Adams v. Grane, 1 Cr. & M. 380, 3 Tyrw. 326;
Brown v. Arundell, 10 C. B. 54; Williams v. Holmes, 8 Exch.
861.
The owner may when sending .is goods to an auctioneer stipu-
late that they shall not be sold below a certain sum, and if the
auctioneer disregards these instructions and sells for a less price, lie
is liable to the owner, like any other agent, for disobeying his
principal's directions : Steele v. .Ellmaker, 11 S. & R. 86; Wolfe
v. Luyster, I Hall 146: Hazul v. -Dunham, Id. 655 ; Wilkinson
v. Campbell, 1 Bay 169.
And in such case the only safe way would seem to be, for the
auctioneer not to start the sale unless the minimum price is first
offered; for according to Lord iANSFIELD'S opinion in the leading
case of Bexwell v. Christie, Cowper 395 (1776), if the goods are
once set up the auctioneer is bound to sell to the highest bidder,
whether the required price is reached or not; and therefore he is
not liable to the owner for selling at a less amount.
It has been said that the auctioneer's authority to sell may be
revoked at any time before sale, even after the bidding has com-
menced; and that subsequent purchasers are bound by such revo-
cation: Mianser v. Back, 6 Hare 443; and in Corryolles v. Mossy,
2 La. 504, it was held that the owner may withdraw the pro-
perty, even after the sale has commenced, if the bid had not been
accepted, and the article struck off, though the Louisiana Code
may have influenced the decision. On the other band if the
owner of goods leaves them in the possession of the auctioneer and
giQes no notice of the revocation of his authority, a subsequent sale
to a bona fide bidder would be valid. See Gunn v. Gillespie, 2
U. C. Q. B. 124. And there are still stronger reasons, as we shall
see, why after the auction has once commenced the owner has no
right to countermand the sale, and forbid the auctioneer to strike
off the goods, or withdraw them from the sale.
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But however that may be, it is clear that in other respects the
auctioneer is bound to obey his instructions, and if directed to sell
at auction he has no right to sell at private sale; and whether the
buyer in such case could or could not lawfully claim the goods, the
auctioneer is liable to his principal for this breach of duty : Marsh
v. Jelf, 3 F. & F. 234; and see MeMechen v. Hayor, &c., 3 Ear.
& J. 534.
And conversely if authorized only to sell at private sale, be has
no right to sell by auction; and if be does so, the purchaser cannot
hold the property, if the circumstances are such as to "put him
on inquiry" : Towle v. Leavitt, 23 N. H. 361.
But to proceed. The auctioneer duly advertises the goods for
sale at a day named. Persons attend at the time and place. The
goods are then withdrawn, and no sale takes place. Have the
would-be buyers any claim on the auctioneer for their loss of time
and expenses in attending, relying upon the unconditional an-
nouncement that the sale would actually take place ? Is there any
contract or implied warranty on the part of the auctioneer that the
goods shall be put up ? It seems not. The advertisement of an
auction sale is not exactly an offer of the goods to the highest
bidder, but rather a declaration of an intention to offer them-an
offer to offer-and consequently it was recently held there is no
liability on the part of the auctioneer to those who attend the ex-
pected sale, for their time and expenses, the advertisement having
been made in good faith: Harris v. -iekerson, L. R., 8 Q. B.
286 (1873); and Spencer v. Harding, L. R., 5 0. P. 561, so far as
it goes, is in the same direction. It might be different if false and
fraudulent representations had been made; for in the very same
year, the same court decided that if a person knowing he did not
own certain property, and therefore could not sell or lease it,
should fraudulently advertise it for sale or lease, and others were
thereby induced to expend time and money in examining the pro-
perty, procuring appraisements, &c., for the purpose of buying or
leasing, such pretended owner would be liable in tort for the deceit,
for the expenses so incurred: 1?ic ardson v. Silvester, L. R., 9 Q.
B. 34. And see BLACKBURN, J., in Mainprice v. Westley, 6 Best
& Sm. 427.
But if the property be once actually put up, and bids are given
and received, under an advertisement or statement that the sale is
to be "without reserve," or that it "will be sold to the highest bid-
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der," it seems that the highest bona fide responsible bidder is enti-
tled to it; and that either the owner or the auctioneer is liable in
some form of action, if he refuses to strike it off to such bidder.
Doubtless the auctioneer may, for the purpose of securing sufficient
bids, and preventing a sacrifice, reasonably adjourn the sale to
some other day, and await future offers. This power is reasonable
for the protection of the owner, and is a well settled right in auc-
tion sales: Richards v. Holmes, 18 How. 143; Bosmer v. Sar-
gent, 8 Allen 97; -Dexter v. Shepard, 117 Mass. 480; Russell v.
Richards, 11 Me. 371; Tinkom v. Purdy, 5 Johns. 345.
But if after waiting a reasonable time no higher bidder appears,
the last and highest bidder certainly seems to have a just claim to
the property. It is sometimes said-nay, very often said-that
the auctioneer is not bound unless he actually strikes off the pro-
perty; and that as the buyer may retract his bid at any time be-
fore the hammer comes down, so, until that event the auctioneer may
retract his affer, and refuse to strike it off; for the alleged reason
that one party is never bound unless the other is; and -Payne v.
Cave, 3 T. R. 148, is relied upon for this principle; re-asserted in
Blossom v. Railroad Co, 3 Wall. 206, and many other places.
But if that is ever true, can it be so when the sale is expressly
advertised to be "without reserve,[ or that the property "will be
sold to the highest bidder ?" It seems that such a proposal is a
standing offer to sell to whoever shall finally become the highest
bidder; and therefore that the auctioneer becomes bound by such
offer the moment a person so far accepts it as to bid, and proves to
be in fact the highest bidder. Such an advertisement excludes any
interference by the vendor or auctioneer, direct or indirect, which
can under any possible circumstances affect the right of the highest
bidder to be declared the purchaser.
It may be the sale is not an entirely complete sale, so as to vest
the present title in the thing sold, until the hammer comes down.
But if that be so, and if the bidder could not maintain replevin
for the identical chattel, does it follow he might not have some
form of action for breach of the auctioneer's implied agreement
and obligation to strike off the property to the highest bidder as
he had advertised and promised to do; a breach of an executory
contract to sell if not a contract of sale. This is a familiar dis-
tinction in private sales. A private purchaser has an action
against a private seller who refuses to deliver and complete his
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executory contract to sell, although he has no complete title to the
specific thing, but only damages for not having it. Why not in
the auction or public sale ? If not, an auction sale is but a farce ?
But it may be asked what binds the auctioneer to let the highest
bidder have the goods ? What is the consideration for such a
contract or promise on his part ? Evidently the promise of the
bidder to take the goods and pay for them the sum. A promise
to buy is always a good consideration for a promise to sell. But
it may be said the promise of the buyer is voidable, that he may
retract his bid at any moment before the hammer comes down, and
Payne v. Cave certainly so holds. So does Fisher v. Seltzer, 23
Penn. St. 308. Be it so. Still a voidable promise is always suffi-
cient to support one on the other side not voidable. An infant's
promise to buy things not necessaries, though voidable, will support
an adult's promise to sell them to him. One is bound, the other
may retract. So of a promise voidable for duress, fraud, or because
only oral under the Statute of Frauds. It is not universally true,
as so often asserted, that neither party is bound unless both are.
In all cases of unilateral contracts the reverse is true. The auc-
tion sale is quite analogous to other public offers, as for rewards, &c.
Why is the person offering a reward for lost property or informa-
tion bound to pay the moment the thing is done by any one? A.
says, "I will pay $100 to any one who will return my lost dog."
B. returns him. That closes the contract. A. might have retracted
before, and if in an equal public manner as his offer, he might not
be liable for a subsequent return. So the auctioneer promises to
sell and deliver the goods to whoever will bid the most for them.
A. bids the most, he does exactly what the auctioneer asked for,
and fulfils the exact condition of his offer. Why should not the
promise to sell and deliver from that moment become binding?
The auctioneer may retract his offer to sell and withdraw the goods
before any body has bid, for up to that moment no one has become
the highest bidder. 'Up to that moment no one has brought back
the lost dog.
But after such bid is made, it is too late; the dog is returned.
The only difference between the two cases is that it may not be
known at the moment of a bid by Mr. A., that he is the highest
bidder, as Mr. B. may bid more; but if in due time no one does bid
more, then it is proved that Mr. A. is the highest bidder, and, if he
has not retracted in the meantime, he is in law still repeating and
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continuing his offer every moment of time while the auctioneer is
crying for more bids. Consequently his rights are just the same
as though the auctioneer had offered the article at a fixed price,
and A. instantly said, "I'll take it at that price." In Warlow v.
Harrison, 1 El. & El. 316; 29 L. J. Q. B. 14; MAETIN, B., says,
"In a sale by auction there are three parties, viz. : the owner of
the property to be sold, the auctioneer, and the portion of the
public who attend to bid, which of course includes the highest
bidder. In this, as in most cases of sales by auction, the owner's
name was not disclosed; he was a concealed principal. The name
of the auctioneers, of whom the defendant was one, alone was
published; and the sale was announced by them to be without
reserve. This, according to all the cases, both at law and equity,
means that neither the vendor nor any person in his behalf shall
bid at the auction, and that the property shall be sold to the highest
bidder, whether the sum bid be equivalent to the real value or not:
T!ornett v. Haines, 15 M. & W. 367. We cannot distinguish
the case of an auctioneer putting up property for sale upon such a
condition from the case of the loser of property offering a reward.
or that of a railway company publishing a time table stating the
times when, and the places to which the trains run. It has been
decided that the person giving the information advertised for, or a
passenger taking a ticket, may sue as upon a contract with him:
Jenton v. Great NTorthern Bailway Co., 5 E. & B. 860. Upon
the same principle it seems to us that the highest bona fide bidder
at an auction may sue the auctioneer as upon a contract that the
sale shall be without reserve. W6 think the auctioneer who puts
the property up for sale upon such a condition pledges himself that
the sale shall be without reserve; or, in other words, contracts that
it shall be so, and that this contract is made with the highest bona
fide bidder ; and, in case of a breach of it, that he has a right of
action against the auctioneer."
For his protection therefore the auctioneer, being liable after he
has once taken and accepted a bid, may refuse to recognise and
take the bid of irresponsible parties, such as minors, insolvents, &c.:
Kinney v. Swwdy, 1 Hill 544; Den v. Zellers, 7 N. J. L. 185;
Gray v. Veirs, 83'Md. 18; Bolder v. Jackson, 11 U. C. C. P. 543.
But if he once accepts and adopts a bid, announces it as a valid
bid, calls for more bids upon the strength of it, then his liability
commences if no one bids more. By " taking" a person's bid, he
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does accept it, conditionally to be sure, but on a condition which he
cannot control-that of a higher bid. It is the acceptance of the
bid in this sense, and not the fall of the hammer, as said to have
been asserted in Payne v. Cave, which fixes the auctioneer's
liability. Indeed, nothing decided in that case militates with this
view. It was an action by the vendor against the buyer, to re-
cover 101., the difference between his bid, and a second sale made
because of his refusal to take under the first bid. And it distinctly
appeared in the evidence that after the defendant had bid 401., and
while the auctioneer was dwelling on the bidding, the defendant
distinctly retracted and told the auctioneer he would not take it;
but nevertheless the auctioneer struck it off to him at 401. Lord
KiENYON nonsuited the vendor, and the whole opinion as reported
is: "The court thought the nonsuit very proper. The auctioneer
is the agent of the vendor, and the assent of both parties is
necessary to make the contract binding ; that is, signified on the
part of the seller by knocking down the hammer, which was not
done here until the defendant had retracted. An auction is not
inaptly called locus pcenitentice. Every bidding is nothing more
than an offer on one side, which is not binding on either side till
it is assented to. But, according to what is now contended for,
one party would be bound by the offer, and the other not, which
can never be allowed. Rule refused." Thus it will be seen the
only point necessary to the decision was that the bidder might
retract before the hammer came down, though the dicta and reason-
ing go somewhat further.
The case of XMainprice v. Vestley, 6 Best & Smith 420, is
sometimes cited in support of the same view; but everything
actually decided was that in that particular sale, owing to the
form of the advertisement, and the explicit reference to the
principal and owner of the property, the auctioneer was not Per-
sonally liable to the highest bidder for not striking off the
property to him; but the judges, especially BLACKBURN, seem to
admit that in ordinary cases, where the auctioneer does not disclose
his principal, he may be personally liable in damages, if he with-
draws the property from the sale, there being an implied warranty
on his part that he would sell to the highest bidder. And in the
subsequent case of H~arris v. ,Nickerson, L. R., 8 Q. B. 289,
QUAIN, J., says: "When a sale is advertised as without reserve,
and a lot is put up and bid for, there is ground for saying, as was
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said, in Warlow v. Harrison, that a contract is entered into
between the auctioneer and the highest bona fide bidder," and
BLACKBURN, J., uses similar language on p. 288.
Such was certainly the opinion of Lord MANSFIELD in Bexwell
v. Christie, Cowper 395.
But whatever may be the rights and remedies of the highest
bidder against either the owner or the auctioneer, before the ham-
mer comes down, it is clear that upon that event, the sale is com-
plete ; the title to the goods immediately passes to the buyer, and
with it the risk of ownership, without any delivery or other for-
mality at common law, though possession may be retained by the
auctioneer until paid for. So although the goods are in the custom
house subject to duties before delivery: Simon v. .etiver, 1 Win.
Bl. 601, where Lord MANSFIELD says, "I remember a case where
some sugars were bought, and afterwards consumed by fire in the
auction warehouse, and the loss fell on the buyer. See also Hinde
v. Whitehouse, 7 East 558, where the goods were sold on the 20th
September, but remained on the premises where the sale took
place until the 22d, when they were destroyed by an accidental
fire. And this case was distinctly approved in Sweeting v. Turner,
L. R., 7 Q. B. 313, although there was, in both cases, an express
stipulation that at the fall of the hammer the property should pass
to the buyer.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.-If, however, the price bid be over 650 in
amount (if necessary, otherwise not), the Statute of Frauds applies,
and some other formalities are necessary to render the contract
binding on either party; for it is now well settled, notwithstanding
the opinion of Lord MANSFIELD and other judges to the con-
trary, in Simon v. .letiver, 1 W. B1. 599, that publie auction
sales are within !he statute, as much as private sales. This is
the universal rule in England and this country: JKenworth1y v.
Schofield, 4 D. & R. 556; 2 B. & C. 945 ; Walker v. Constable,
1 B. & P. 306; Peiree v. Corf, L. R., 9 Q. B. 210; Davis v.
Rowell, 2 Pick. 64; .3orton v. Dean, 13 Met. 385; Horton v.
McCarty, 53 Me. 394; Brent v. Green, 6 Leigh 16; Burke v.
Hfaley, 7 Ill. 614; Hicks v. Whitmore, 12 Wend. 548.
And, if no memorandum be made, the auctioneer or vendor may
repudiate the bargain as well as the buyer, and in that case may
immediately resell the goods for a higher price to any other par-
ties: Pike v. Baleh, 38 Me. 302.
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It is the right and duty of the auctioneer, therefore, upon strik-
ing off such goods, to call for the name of the buyer, if unknown,
in order that he may make the memorandum required by the
statute; and a neglect to make such memorandum is a breach of
his official duty, rendering him liable to his employer if thereby
the sale proves abortive: Townsend v. -Fan Tassel, 8 Daly 261;
Peirce v. Corf, L. R. 9 Q. B. 210.
In Hicks v. Hinturn, 19 Wend. 550, it was held that negligence
was the gist qf his liability in such cases, and as the statute ex-
pressly requiring him to make such memorandum, was new, and of
doubtful construction, the omission was held not conclusive proof
of negligence.
The auctioneer, as is universally conceded, is the authorized
agent of his employer, the vendor, to make this memorandum, so
as to bind his principal; but as to his authority to bind the buyer,
more confusion exists. It is commonly stated that an auctioneer
is agent for both parties to make a memorandum under the Statute
of Frauds; as though he was equally, and under all circum-
stances, the agent of the one as well as the other; but it is conceived
that this is not so; that his authority to bind the vendor arises
from his being employed by him to sell, and of course to make a
valid and binding sale, and therefore to do all acts necessary to
make the sale valid and binding on' his principal. Whereas he is
not generally agent for the bidder to buy. He is acting adversely
to him throughout the sale, and has no authority virtute officii, to
bind him. His agency or authority, therefore, must rest on some
express direction or request from the buyer, or his tacit assent and
approval that such memorandum may be made; as by standing by
and seeing it done without objection; or by the existence of a
general custom and usage to that effect, of which 'the buyer must
be presumed to be aware. And therefore while he may bind the
vendor by a memorandum made at any time, either before, during,
or after the sale, and without regard to the vendor's presence or
absence, knowledge or ignorance, yet it is clear he cannot so bind
the purchaser, after the sale is entirely over and the latter has de-
parted without in any way assenting to such action by ihe auction-
eer. See Horton v. X!cCarty, 53 Me. 394; Walker v. Herring,
21 Gratt. 678; Smith v. Arnold, 5 Mason 418, STORY, J.; Lfews
v. Carr, 1 H. & N. 488; Banzber v. Savage, 12 Rep. 96; .Flintoft,
v. .Bmore, 18 U. 0. 0. P. 274. And see Sugden on Vendors (14th
VOL. XXL-2
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ed.) p. 147; Gill v. Bicknell, 2 Cush. 355, SHAW, 0. J.; .Entz
v. Mills, 1 McMullan 453.
An auctioneer, therefore, has no more authority, virtute officii,
to bind the purchaser by his memorandum than any other agent
of the vendor has; and that may be the reason why an auctioneer
who is also the owner selling his own goods is not created such
agent by any indirection or implication: Smith v. Arnold, 5 Mason
414; Bent v. Cobb, 9 Gray 397; Tull v. David, 45 Mo. 444;
Adams v. Scales, 1 Baxt. (57 Tenn.) 388.
So where there were written conditions of sale, one of which was_
that the purchaser should pay for the goods upon delivery, and in
which at the time the auctioneer in the usual manner wrote down
the name of the purchaser, in an action by the real owner for the
price bid, the purchaser was allowed to show by parol an oral
agreement between himself and the plaintiff, the owner, made
before the day of sale, that the purchase-money should be set off
against a debt due from the plaintiff to the purchaser, notwith-
standing the objection made, that such testimony went to vary the
written contract of sale ; and it was held that the auctioneer was
not the agent of the purchaser to bind him by any memorandum to
pay for them in cash: Bartlett v. Purnell, 4 Ad. & El. 792; 6
Nev. & Mann. 299; 2 Harr. & Wall. 16.
Indeed some English cases seem to hold that a vendor cannot,
under any circumstances, be agent for the buyer to bind him by a
memorandum under the Statute of Frauds: Wirright v. JDannah,
2 Camp. 203 ; PFarebrother v. Simmons, 5 13. & Ald. 333 ; Bayner
v. Linthorne, 2 C. & P. 124; Sharran v. Brandt, L. R. 6 Q. B.
720. But possibly no more.is meant by those cases than that he
could not be such agent without clear evidence of an express
request or authority by the buyer so to act.
But whenever he has authority this entry or memorandum may
be made, in the presence of all parties, by the auctioneer's clerk,
as well as by the auctioneer himself: Bird v. Boulter, 4 B. & Ad.
443; Alna v. -Plummer, 4 Greenl. 258; Hart v. Woods, 7 Blackf.
568; Cathcart v. Keirnaghan, 5 Strob. 129 ; CJlarkson v. _Noble.
2 U. C. Q. B. 361; Price v. Durin, 56 Barb. 647.
This memorandum must be full and complete of itself, and state
all the material terms and conditions of the sale, such as a suffi-
cient description of the property; names of buyer and seller, prices,
credit if any, &c., &c., or it is fatally defective, and the sale is not
AUCTION SALES.
uf~lzeable. The priated conditions of the sale not ieferred to in
the memorandum, cannot be resorted to for the purpose of supply-
ing the defect: Rishton v. Wlatmore, 8 Ch. Div. 467 ; 111orton v.
Dean, 13 Met. 385; Horton v. McCarty, 53 Me. 394; -Peirce v.
Cof, L. 1R., 9 Q. B. 210 ; Johnson v. Buck, 35 N. J. L. 339;
Bamber v. Savage, 12 Reporter 95 ; .idgway v. Ingram, 50 Ind.
145.
The memorandum has been held necessary wherever all the arti-
cles bought bythe same purchaser, atthe same auction, and belonging
to the same owner, amount in the aggregate to over $50, although
no one article equals that amount; and on the ground that such a
sale is one entire, single sale, and not several distinct and separate
sales of each and every article; even though some interval of time
may elapse between each transaction or bid: Jenncss v. Wendell,
51 N. H. 63; Allard v. Greasert, 61 N. Y. 1; Coffman v. Hamp-
ton, 2 W. & S. 377; Tompkins v. Haas, 2 Penn. St. 74; Gilman
v. Hill, 36 N. H. 311.
And for a like reason an acceptance and receipt of oie of such
articles has been held to bind the buyer to the whole purchase,
made by different bids: Hinde v. Whitehouse, 7 East 558; Mills
v. Hunt, 17 Wend. 333; 20 Id. 431: Baldey v. -Parker, 3 D. &
Ry. 220; 2 B. & C. 37; Bigg v. WTisking, 14 0. B. 195.
But this entirety of contract may be much a matter of intention
in each individual case, and there are good grounds for holding
that separate negotiations, at separate prices, where the several
parcels have no necessary or supposed connection with each other,
do not always form a single entire contract, though made on the
same day, and between the same parties. This is especially true
probably in sales of lands. See -Emmerson v. Heelis, 2 Taunt.
38; Van 1-ps v. Mayor, &c.. of Schenectady, 12 Johns. 436;
Mott v. Mott, 68 N. Y. 246; Boots v. Dormer, 4 B. & Ad. 77;
Wfells v. Day, 124 Mass: 38.
EFFECT Or MISTAKE.-Most of the general principles of the
law of sales, apply to auction sales; and some of them have pecu-
liar force and importance in such transactions. Thus from the
nature of the case mistakes are more likely to occur at auctions
than at private sales, and therefore it is well established that if
the bidder acts under an honest mistake of fact as to the thing to
be sold, he is not bound by his bid. Thus where in an auction
sale of various articles by a printed and numbered catalogue, the
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lot No. 24 was being sold, and a party bid, supposing lot No. 25
was up, it was held he was not bound by his offer; and that from
the mistake there was no sale of either parcel: Sheldon v. Capron,
8 R. I. 171. And see Alegaw v. Molloy, 2 Law Rep. (Ir.) 530
(1878), a very important case involving this principle.
Certainly courts of equity do not enforce against the buyer, a
contract made under a bona fide mistake of fact as to the lot put
up for sale: Malins v. PFreernan, 2 Keen 25.
EFFECT oF ORAL DECLARATIONS.-After a sale by auction, the
contract is sometimes reduced to writing, and the terms and condi-
tions of sale, inserted therein, and duly signed by both parties.
This is more usual in sales of real estate ; and in such cases, the
written contract forms the sole evidence of the bargain, and in the
absence of fraud its term's cannot be varied, in favor of either
party; by proof of oral declarations by the auctioneer at the sale,
inconsistent therewith. The vendor is bound to convey according
to the terms of the writing, and the buyer can demand no more,
whatever might have been announced at the sale, of a different
import. Such declarations are merged in the subsequent written
agreement. See Powell v. Jdmunds, 12 East 6; Sheltonv. Levins,
2 Or. & J. 411; Bradshaw v. Bennett, 5 0. & P. 48 ; lead v.
Hlendry, 1 U. C. Q. B. 238. Therefore where an estate was offered
at auction, described in the printed conditions as "free from encum-
brance," and the defendant bought under those terms, the fact that
the auctioneer orally stated at the sale that they were encumbered,
was not allowed to modify the printed statement: CGunes v. Erh art,
1 H. El. 290. It does not appear in this case that the buyer was
present when the oral declaration was made, but the decision does
not seem to have been placed on that special ground.
But although the sale takes place under printed conditions, and
terms posted up in the auction room, yet if these are not incor-
porated into a. regular written contract, signed by the parties, but
rest only as matters of description, they may be controlled by oral
declarations made befdre the sale by the auctioneer in the presence
and hearing of the defendant who bought. Thus, where at an
auction of some articles of plate, described in the advertisement as
being made "of silver," but the auctioneer stated publicly in the
defendant's presence, before the bidding commenced, that it had
been discovered that they were "only plated," the defendant was
held bound to pay the price he subsequently bid, notwithstanding
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the printed description was not formally erased: Eden v. Blake,
13 M. & W. 614. See also, Satterfield v. Smith, 11 Ired. 60;
Manser v. Back, 6 Hare 443.
EFFIOT OF FnrLuD.-The cardinal principle of all auction sales
is that they shall be entirely free, open, unbiased and unprejudiced.
Neither party can resort to any stratagem, artifice, or device to
secretly increase or depress the bidding. The seller must not
(unless the right is expressly and publicly reserved) employ by-
bidders to enhance the price; and if he does, a subsequent bona
fidZe bidder may, upon discovering the fact, refuse to take the
property, or if he has paid the money, before hearing of the fraud,
may recover it back. Such by-bidders are called "white bonnets"
in Scotland; elsewhere sometimes named "barkers."
No doubt the owner may publicly reserve a right to bid when
he offers the property, and in such case, if he does not exceed his
reserved right, a sale to a subsequent bidder is binding: Dimmock
v. Hfallett, L. R., 2 Oh. App. 21. This reserved right to bid is gen-
erally understood to allow only one bid, and in such cases, a series
of biddings, or any other excess of his right, would render voidable
a subsequent sale to an innocent party: Alortimer v. Bell, 1 Oh.
App. 10; G-illiat v. Gilliat, L. R., 9 Eq. 59; 1Parfitt v. Jepson,
46 L. J. 0. P. 529, a valuable case not in the "regular" reports.
But unless some such right is publicly reserved, or in other
words if the property is advertised to be sold "without reserve,"
or to the "highest bidder," the employment of a by-bidder, un-
known to the purchaser, excuses him from fulfilling his contract:
Bexwell v. Christie, Cowp. 395; Howard v. Castle, 6 T. R. 642;
Crowder v. Austin, 11 Moore 283, and 3 Bing. 368; Wheeler v.
Collier, Moody & Malkin 123; Rex v. Harsh, 3 Y. & J. 331 ;
Thornett v. Haines, 15 M. & W. 367; Green v. Baverstock, 14 0.
B. (N. S.) 204.
Such was formerly the well-established rule in equity also:
.3eadows v. Tanner, 5 Madd. 34; -BobnsoA v. Wall, 2 Ph. 372.
And the American courts have generally adopted the rule, both
at law and equity: Pennock's Appeal, 14 Penn. St. 446; Staines
v. Shore, 16 Id. 200; Towle v. Leavitt, 23 N. H. 360; National
Bank v. Sprague, 20 N. J. Eq. 159; Veazie v. Williams, 8 How.
1-34. So under the civil code of Louisiana: Corryolles v. Mossy,
2 La. 504; Baham v. Bach, 13 Id. 287.
Such secret by-bidding will avoid the sale to a bona fide bidder,
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even though it was procured by the auctioneer, and without the
real owner's knowledge: he cannot take advantage of his agent's
fraud: 7 eazie v. Williams, 8 How. 134, where the auctioneer
himself advanced the bidding from $20,000 to $40,000, before it
was struck off to a real bidder, and the principal was compelled
to refund the excess of $20,000; Curtis v. Aspinwall, 114 Mass.
187; Baham v. Bach, 13 La. 287. In Curtis v. Aspinwall,
this rule was applied although the by-bidding did not take place on
the identical lot in controversy, but on lots sold previously at the
same sale; the different lots being parcels of one larger tract, the
sale of which would naturally affect the price of subsequent sales.
This stratagem of employing by-bidders is so odious to the law,
that the by-bidder, it is said, cannot recover compensation for his
services in the fraud. And for a similar reason, if the property
is in fact struck off to him, the owner cannot avoid the sale, and
take advantage of his own fraud: Troughton v. Johnston, 2 Hayw.
328.
Strange to say, courts of equity, at one time, recognised the
right of a vendor to make one bid, if it was done merely to pre-
vent a sacrifice of the property below its real value, and not to
unduly enhance it. See Bramley v. Alt, 3 Yes. 620 (1798); Smith
v. Clarke, 12 Id. 481 ; Flint v. TFoodin, 9 Rare 618 ; Woodward
v. 31iller, 2 Col. 0. 0. 279. Sometimes adopted in this country:
Veazie v. Williams, 3 Story 623; -Reynolds v. Dechaums, 24
Tex. 174.
But such a doctrine could only have one result. No by-bidder
ever would afterwards be employed to "puff the sale," but only to
"prevent a sacrifice !" Every bidder has a perfect right to buy at an
undervaluation if he honestly can: Staines v. Shore, 16 Penn. St.
200. The rule itself was so dangerous, that after a long conflict in
this respect between courts of law and courts of equity, in which the
former most certainly applied the higher principles of equity, Par-
liament interfered anZd by Statute 30 and 31 Vict., c. 48 (1867),
declared that whenever "a sale by auction of land would be
invalid at law by reason of the employment of a puffer, the same
shall be deemed invalid in equity as well as at law, and also pro-
viding that the particulars or conditions of such sales should ex-
pressly state whether the land is to be sold without reserve, or
subject to a reserved price, or whether a right to bid is reserved;
and if it is stated that the land will be sold without reserve, or to
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that effect, it shall not be lawful for the owner to employ any per-
son to bid at such sale, or for the auctioneer to knowingly take any
bidding from any such person."
But this statute applies only to land sales, and leaves the law
still unsettled as to sales 6f goods and chattels.
It is also a fraud on the buyer to misrepresent as to material
facts about the property to be sold; as to advertise it as having
belonged to some well-known gentleman (who is understood to have
been a good judge of such propefty), and "sold by order of his
executors," &c., or other similar misrepresentations. Such fraud
vitiates the sale: Lord MANSFIELD in Bexwell v. Christie, Cowper
397 ; Bex v. Kenriek, 5 Q. B. 49.
Therefore if the goods advertised for sale are described as the
property of '.'A. deceased," and some of the goods of B. are min-
gled with them, and sold as A.'s, the buyer is not bound to take
them, upon learning the facts: Thomas v. Kerr, 3 Bush 619.
But in order to avoid a sale for any fraud, the buyer should
repudiate promptly, upon discovering the facts, or he may waive
and lose his rights to rescind the sale: Backenstoss v. Stahler, 33
Penn. St. 251; McDowell v. Simms, 6 Ired. Eq. 278; Tomlinson v.
Savage, Id. 430; McDowell v. Simms, Busbee Eq. 130. If the fraud
is not discovered until it is too late to return the property, he may
defend in an action for the price; Staines v. Shore, 16 Penn. St.
200.
So much for the vendor's frauds. Now as to the buyer's.
In like manner the buyer must not resort to stratagem, or undue
influence to depress the price, or "chill the sale," as it is termed.
Tius at an auction sale of a barge, one bidder iold the bystanders
that the owner had not used him well, that he still owed him for
building the barge, and he wanted to buy it to make himself whole.
Therefore they refrained from bidding, and the barge, though
worth 1501., was struck off to him for 501. The auctioneer, on
discovering the facts, refused to deliver the barge, and sold it
again for over 1001. ; and the first buyer brought suit for the pro-
perty, but it was held he was not entitled to it: Fuller v. Abra-
hams, 6 Moore 316; 3 Br. & Bing. 116.
So where land was being sold for taxes, and one bystander told
the other "it was no use to bid on that land, for the owner would
certainly redeem it in a. short time," and thus deterred others from
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bidding, and bought it himself, it was held the sale was void for
this unfair influence: Slater v. Maxwell, 6 Wall. 268.
So, if a bidder gives the bystanders to understand he is bidding
for the absent owner (as where his property is being sold adversely
to him on execution), and thus induces others not to bid, out of
sympathy or regard for such owner, the bidder cannot claim the
property struck off to him at a low price by reason of this fraud:
Cocks v. Izard, 7 Wall. 559. And see McDonald v. May, 1 Rich.
Eq. 91; Kinard v. Hiers, 3 Id. 423; S cmidt v. Gatewood, 2
Id. 162; Johnston v. La Motte, 6 Id. 347.
So if a bidder makes fraudulent statements as to the existence
of mortgages on the property, for the purpose of deterring bidders,
and thus obtains the property at less than its fair value, the sale
may be set aside for the fraud: Jackson v. Morter, 82 Penn. St.
291.
So if one who wishes to buy secretly employs a well-known
agent of the owner to bid for him, and this deters others from bid-
ding under the belief that such agent is bidding for the owner,
and therefore that other bidders do not have a fair chance for pur-
chasing the property, such would-be buyer cannot enforce a sale
made to him through such agent, at a low valuation of the pro-
perty: Twining v. lMorrice, 2 Bro. 0. 0. 326.
So if two persons agree not to bid against each other, for the
purpose of stifling competition, and buy the property at a low rate,
for their common benefit, this contract is not only void between
themselves (Phippen v. Stickney, 3 Met. 387; Atcheson v. Mal-
Ion, 43 N. Y. 148; Gardiner v. Morse, 25 Me. 140) but also
avoids the sale as against the vendor, and he is not bound to con-
vey: Dudley v. Little, 2 Ohio 504; Loyd v. Malone, 23 Ill. 43;
Wooton v. Hinkle, 20 Mo. 290.
Therefore if A. gives B. his note to induce him not to bid against
him at an auction sale, such note is void as against public policy
and cannot be enforced by B. : Jones v. Caswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 29.
For it is certain courts will not enforce any executory contract
between the two who have thus combined to stifle competition at
a public auction sale: Doolin v. Ward, 6 Johns. 194; Wilbur v.
How, 8 Id. 444; Tompson v. Davies, 13 Id. 112; Gardiner v.
Morse, 25 Me. 140 ; Hook v. Turner, 22 Mo. 333 ; Atcheson v.
Mallon, 43 N. Y. 147 ; Gulick v. Bailey, 5 Halst. 87.
So if one bidder actually pays money to another to induce him
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to withdraw his bid, and aid him in getting the property, this
is illegal, and the party paying cannot recover back his money,
although the receiver failed to carry out his part of the unlawful
agreement: Sharp v. Wright, 35 Barb. 236.
In England the sale itself has been enforced, against the vendor,
although the bidder paid another party not to bid: Heifer v. Afar-
tyn, 36 L. J. Ch. 372 (1867). But this seems contrary to our
law.
It is otherwise as to a combination of persons, formed merely to
enable them to buy, in the name of one, some large estate, to be
divided between them, because too large for any one purchaser
alone. This tends rather to enhance the price than reduce it, and
the sale is not only valid, but the contract to divide may be en-
forced: Smith v. Green lee, 2 Dev. 126 (1829); Phippen v. Stick-
ney, 3 Mlet. 387; In re Carew, 26 Beav. 187; Galton v. Emuss,
8 Jur. 507; Breslin v. Brown, 24 Ohio St. 571; McMinn v.
Phipp~s, 3 Sneed 196 ; James v. _alerod, 5 Tex. 512; fearney
v. Taylor, 15 How. 519; Switzer v. Skiles, 3 Gilm. 529.
It seems to be a necessary element of a fair auction sale, that
the biddings should be open and public, so that parties interested
may have equal means of knowing the true state of the bidding.
The auctioneer, therefore, ought not to arrange secret signals with
some parties by which they can make bids which others do not
understand: Conover v. Walling, 15 N. J. Eq. 173.
In one case, with which the writer was conversant, a large sale
of a valuable iron property in Pennsylvania took place, and a
would-be purchaser agreed beforehand with the auctioneer to
stand in a conspicuous position, and so long as the buyer continued
to hold his right hand with the thumb in the armhole of his vest,
the auctioneer should add $100 to every bid made by other parties.
By this means the property was struck off to him, much to the sur-
prise of all other bidders; but the sale was set aside; for clearly
an auctioneer has no right to bid, either for himself, or other par-
ties, unless the fact is publicly known : Church v. Marine ns.
Co., 1 Mason 341; Barker v. Marine ins. Co., 2 Mass. 369;
Brock v. Bice, 27 Gratt. 812.
In another case sealed bids or offers were called for, and several
parties sent in bids for a specific amount, but one party proposed
to give " $601 above the highest bid of the highest responsible
bidder," but named no exact sum. This was held to be no valid
VOL. XXI.-3
AUCTION SALES.
bid, since it gave such party an unfair advantage over other
competitors : Webster v. _1rench, 11 Ill. 254, where the subject is
carefully considered.
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES OF PAiTIES.-But supposing a sale has
been fairly and legally made, so as to bind both parties, what are
the rights and remedies of each.
In the first place, the auctioneer has no authority to rescind a
sale, when once validly made, and take back the goods or release
the purchaser from the contract. His duty and authority is " to
sell," not to unsell: Yelson v. Aldridqe, 2 Stark. 884; Boinest v.
Leigner, 2 Rich. (S. 0.) 464.
And if the bidder refuses to take and pay for the goods, the auc-
tioneer may immediately put them up again, resell and charge the
first bidder with the loss: Springer v. Berry, 47 Me. 330; Boinest
v. Leignez, 2 Rich. (S. 0.) 464; _urniss v. Sawers, 8 U. 0. Q.
B. 77. Though the form of remedy would seem to be a special
action of contract for the difference, and not a declaration for goods
bargained and sold: Lamond v. -Daval, 9 Q. B. 1080.
He is ordinarily bound, in the absence of usage or custom to the
contrary, to sell for cash, and if he gives credit, or takes a time note
of the buyer in payment, without authority, the owner may repu-
diate that part of the sale, and recover the price forthwith: Per-
rers v. Bobins, 2 C., M. & R. 152; 1 Gale 70; 5 Tyrwh. 705;
Williams v. Evans, L. R., 1 Q. B. 352.
And if the terms of sale expressly require payment "in cash,"
the auctioneer has no right to take the buyer's check in payment;
and if he does, the buyer cannot enforce the sale until actual pay-
ment of the check: Broughton v. Silloway, 114 Mass. 71 ; Sykes
v. Giles, 5 M. & W. 645.
And if the auctioneer allows the buyer to take and carry away
the goods, without paying for them, contrary to the custom, be is
liable to the owner for the amount of the sale, whether the buyer
would.or would not be: Brown v. Staton, 2 Chitty 353.
As to the recovery of the price, the auctioneer, in case of a §ale
of goods, has such a special property or interest in the goods, that
he can ordinarily sue and recover for the same in his own name,
although known to be acting only as agent; and it seems to make
no difference in this respect, whether the name of his principal is
known or not: Williams v. Millington, 1 H. Bl. 81; Hulse v.
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Young, 16 Johns. 1; T/ompsonv. Kely, 101 Mass. 296; Belier
v .Bloclc, 19 Ark. 566 ; Planegan v. Crull, 53 Ill. 352.
This right is more obvious, perhaps, where the auctioneer is un-
paid, and has a lien on the price for his fees and disbursements; but
it is not confined to such cases ; for though he has been paid in full
by the principal, he may still recover'the price in his own name,
unless the principal has done something to interfere with that right.
The purchaser cannot object merely because the suit is brought by
an agent: Minturn v. Jlfain, 7 N. Y. 220. Though, of course, in
such case the owner could sue and recover the whole price in his
own name: Girard v. Taggart, 5 S. & R. 19.
This lien of the auctioneer for his unpaid fees and disburse-
ments, is so strong, that if the buyer pays the whole price to the
real owner, the auctlbneer may still recover of him the amount of
his unpaid fees, &c., in an action for the price: Robinson v. Rutter,
4 El. & B1. 956; Johnson v. Buck, 35 N. J. L. 338.
If, however, the auctioneer has been fully paid, his right to
recover the price in his own name is only prima facie; for, if the
buyer and the real owner have made some agreement as to the
mode of payment, or to offset a counter claim, proof of this would
defeat an action by the auctioneer; for, if fully paid himself, he is
suing only to enforce his principal's rights : Grice v. Kenrick,
L. R., 5 Q. B. 340. So far as the cases of 0oppin v. Walker, 7
Taunt. 237, and Coppin v. Craig, Id. 243, seem to lay down any
different doctrine, they must be considered as somewhat modified.
And see Iseberg v. Bowden, 8 Exch. 858.
If a bidder declines to give the name of the real buyer, he is
personally liable to the auctioneer for the price: Mc Comb v.
Wright, 4 Johns. Ch. 659; Nat. Jire Ins. Co. v. Loomis, 11
Paige 431.
As to an auctioneer's right to sue for the price of real estate
sold, it is quite different from that in sales of personal property.
The auctioneer has no possession and apparent ownership of real
estate, and the right to recover in his own name must depend on
the terms and conditions of the sale. If the buyer has expressly
agreed, or impliedly assented to pay the auctioneer in person, the
action may be maintained, otherwise not: Cherry v. Anderson, 10
Ir. Rep. 0. L. 204; -vans v. -Evans, 3 Ad. & El. 132; Fisher v.
Marsh, 6 B. & S. 411; Thompson v. Kelly, 101 Mass. 296.
For an auctioneer's right or interest in real estate he is selling,
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or in fixtures attached thereto, is quite different from that in goods
'and chattels., He cannot maintain trespass in his own name for
wrongfally removing such fixtures (Davis v. Danks, 3 Ex. 435)
as he could for wrongfully removing personal property in his pos-
session : Tyler v. JTreeman, 3 Cush. 261.
And even if employed to sill goods on the premises of the owner,
he has not, prior to such sale, such an interest or right in the
premises as to prevent the owner from countermanding his author-
ity and ordering him to depart, and from ejecting him, if he refuses
to leave. Taplin v. Florence, 10 C. B. 744, in which the subject
was much considered.
AuOTIO EER'S LIAILITrs.-An auctioneer is ordinarily per-
sonally responsible to the buyer to fulfil the sale; at least when he
declines to give the name of his principal: Mills v. Hunt, 117
Wend. 333; 20 Id. 431; Bush v. Cole, 28 N. T. 261; Franklyn
v. Lamond, 4 0. B. 637; Hanson v. Bobedeau, Peake 120;
Woolfe v. Horne, 2 Q. B. Div. 355.
But the disclosure of the principal's name, and other circum-
stances, may show that the contract is solely between the buyer
and the owner, and that the remedy of the former is solely against
the principal: Malinprice. v. Westley, 6 B. & S. 420; Evans v.
-Evans, 3 Ad. & E. 132.
If' the auctioneer expressly warrants the title or quality of the
goods, it would seem the buyer's remedy, if done without the prin-
cipal's sanction, is against the auctioneer in person: -Dent v. Me-
Grath, 3 Bush 175; Schell v. Stephens, 50 Mo. 375; Somers v.
O'_Donohue, 9 U. 0. 0. P. 208.
For it is at least questionable whether an auctioneer has author-
ity, virtute officii, to bind the owner by an express warranty, in
the absence of some general usage or custom to that effect: The
Monte Allegre, 9 Wheat. 647; Upton v. Suffolk Mills, 11 Cush.
589 ; Blood v. French, 9 Gray 198, 199.
The auctioneer is, of course, personally liable to his principal
for want of ordinary care and skill in conducting the sale: 1faltby
v. Christie, 1 Esp. 340; Kavanagh v. Cuthbert, 9 Ir. R. 0. L.
136; Hibbert v. Bayley, 2 F. & F. 48; Cull v. Wakefield, 6 U. 0.
Q. B. 178. And having collected the proceeds is liable to an
action for money had and received, deducting his commissions, and
counter claims: Succession of .Dowler, 29 La. Ann. 437; Harlow
